Dossier Center Investigation: The Kremlin hopes to restore influence in the Baltic states
Plans hindered by the war in Ukraine
Translation of a Dossier Center Investigation
April 26, 2023
The Kremlin has developed strategies to influence the internal politics of the Baltic countries. Russian officials were going to manipulate local businessmen to ensure the loyalty of the Baltic governments, as well as deter the support of the Russian opposition from the Lithuanian authorities.
The documents show that Russian officials fear Estonian participation in the development of Finno-Ugric separatism, the freezing of Russian assets in Latvia and the installation of NATO air defense systems in Lithuania. Earlier, the Dossier Center spoke about similar strategies for Belarus and Moldova.
All this became known from documents received by a consortium of international journalists. Our colleagues showed these documents to European politicians and experts. Together with them, we figured out what exactly the Kremlin is planning, how realistic these tasks are, and why they are dangerous.
The Dossier Center prepared this material in cooperation with Delfi Estonia, Expressen, NDR ( Norddeutscher Rundfunk), Frontstory.pl, Süddeutsche Zeitung, VSquare, WDR ( Westdeutscher Rundfunk), Yahoo News, Re:Baltica, and LRT.
In 2021, the Kremlin’s plans were formulated in documents called “Strategic goals of the Russian Federation in the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian direction.” They were developed in the border relations department of the presidential administration with the assistance of special services. It was also preparing a strategy for absorbing Belarus by 2030 and intervening in the politics of Moldova.
Separate strategies have been developed for each of the three countries, but some of the objectives are the same.
Restoration of relations between Russia and the Baltic countries.
Formation of a network of "soft power" organizations advocating cooperation with Russia.
Prevention of the militarization of countries and the creation of new NATO bases on their territory.
Recruitment of Baltic businessmen with promises to open the Russian market for them if their countries change their policy towards Moscow.
Preservation of "common historical memory and Soviet monuments."
The exclusion of "discrimination against the Russian-speaking population" and the preservation of education in Russian.
In light of the current geopolitical situation, these plans may seem naive - how can we talk about the full restoration of communication when the Baltic states and Russia continue to reduce the level of diplomatic relations?
Former Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, who has studied strategy, told Yahoo News that the Kremlin is "out of touch with reality" and does not understand what is happening in the Baltics at all.
For example, while the AP planned to guard Soviet monuments, in 2022 there was a wave of demolitions of memorials to soldiers from World War II in the Baltic states. For the Baltics, this is getting rid of the symbols of the Soviet occupation and a sign of protest against the war in Ukraine. For the Kremlin - "fascism" and the loss of the cultural lever of "soft power,"- the opportunity to enter into a dialogue is convenient for Russian officials with local residents.
One of the Kremlin's most realistic goals is to use local businesses to lobby its interests.
“Entrepreneurs are the most easily vulnerable and influenced group. Once a politician runs out of votes and power, he has nothing left. But as long as businessmen have money, they will try to influence [politics] in their own interests. Russia uses this tactic all the time, including in Ukraine and in the so-called “LNR and DNR.”
As a strategic plan, these documents are very insightful. If you want to outplay the enemy, tie him to you: with the help of economy, trade, culture, and so on,” Alexander Toots, deputy head of the Estonian Internal Security Service, explained to Delfi.
The Kremlin considered the exit of countries from BRELL, the electric ring of Belarus, Russia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, to be the biggest problem in the Baltic region. This is an agreement on the synchronous operation of energy systems at a single current frequency. For a long time, the unity in the work of the energy systems of the countries was strategically important for Russia because of Kaliningrad. Since the region is a Russian enclave, the power system would not be able to work in case of desynchronization.
The Baltic states decided in 2017 that they would withdraw from this agreement by 2025 and are now in the process of desynchronization - technically they are still part of the Russian power grid.
The Russian government is preparing to support Kaliningrad's energy in this scenario, but the withdrawal of the Baltic states is a blow. “It is difficult and expensive to keep a small system running smoothly in isolation,” said Kalle Kilk, board member of the Estonian energy operator Elering.
BRELL, as part of the trade and economic sphere, remains one of the last tools of the Kremlin's influence in the West.
“The biggest part of the strategy in the Baltics is influence in energy and business. And I would say that this is the last means of Russian influence, because in Lithuania we are completely independent. Therefore, they are trying to do everything possible to save at least it, so that their strategy, using energy and business in the Baltic countries, works, ”summed up Lithuanian security expert Marius Laurinavičius.
But, unlike, for example, Belarus, the Kremlin’s strategy was not designed for the complete subordination of the region, but rather for attempts to interest local residents in the Kremlin’s ideology:
“Even among Russian politicians, only a minority still believes that the Baltic states can be returned. Instead, an attempt is being made to preserve the remaining influence with hybrid measures. They support pro-Russian parties, appeal to people with dual citizenship and try to increase the number of supporters in parliament, ”explained an interlocutor of foreign journalists from Western intelligence.
Latvia
Latvia has the largest Russian-speaking population of all the Baltic countries. The Dossier Center is aware of a number of attempts by the Kremlin to interfere in the internal affairs of the country, which were carried out until 2022. Russian authorities have long supported pro-Kremlin forces in Latvia. Among them were local politicians and parties, as well as the Russian Peace Foundation, the Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad, the Alexander Nevsky Foundation, and the Public Diplomacy Foundation Gorchakov. The budget of the latter was about 100 million euros per year. They funded a sprawling network of organizations across Latvia that promoted the Kremlin's agenda in public space and tried to influence the country's domestic politics.
The Kremlin's high hopes for Latvia are evident from the intervention strategy itself: it is the most voluminous of the three. Thus, the presidential administration planned to expand the already existing network of supporters and nurture pro-Russian leaders in the centrist parties. Moreover, they had to work not only for the Russian-speaking electorate but also for the Latvians.
An even more ambitious goal was set by 2030 - the Kremlin hoped to achieve the recognition of the Russian language as the state language in Latvia and solve the problem of mass statelessness of former citizens of the USSR.
Non-citizens of Latvia are a group of people who do not have citizenship of any country and are not foreigners. This category of the population arose after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when Latvia gained independence, and many residents of the country who previously had Soviet citizenship found themselves stateless.
Latvia recognized as citizens only those who had the right to citizenship under laws adopted before the Soviet occupation, or their descendants. Other residents had to go through the naturalization process.
However, many residents of Latvia have chosen not to acquire Latvian citizenship for various reasons. For example, they did not want to give up the citizenship of the USSR, which they had previously. Or they did not want to learn the Latvian language and local history, which are necessary for obtaining citizenship.
One of the main threats to its plans, according to documents, the Kremlin considered the work of the NATO Center for Strategic Communications (StratCom COE). It has existed since 2014, and its task is to promote the development of strategic communications within the alliance, as well as to provide support and expertise to NATO on these issues.
The fact that this center poses a threat to Russia was previously said by Sergei Shoigu.
“Today, information has become one of the weapons. A propaganda strategy center has been set up in Riga, and centers have been set up in Tallinn and Warsaw. An information weapon is being created there, which is being introduced and distributed throughout our country. These centers, in particular, spread many rumors, not the best “flavors” come from these structures,” the Russian Defense Minister said in 2021.
Director of the NATO Center for Advanced Strategic Communications Janis Sarts draws attention to the role of information in the Kremlin's Baltic strategies:
“We are one of the leading centers in the Baltics that understand Russia's actions, we have invested a lot in learning how it works and how to counter it. We may have disrupted some of their plans with our activities. This document only proves once again that the information space is one of Russia's tools in the war."
The main points of the Kremlin's plan in Latvia
2022
Military-political sphere and security
Involving Latvia in the common agenda with Russia (environment of the Baltic region, education, culture, humanitarian cooperation) using existing regional formats, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States
NATO's opposition to the militarization of the Baltic countries
Formation of new pro-Russian public structures, foundations, NPOs, and NGOs
Humanitarian sphere
Resumption of the work of the joint Russian-Latvian Commission of Historians to translate discussions on sensitive historical topics into the plane of scientific research
Trade and economic sphere
Reorientation of Russian cargo flows to the ports of the North-West of Russia
Placement of Latvian production facilities in Russia
Promotion of Russian goods to the Latvian market
2025
Military-political sphere and security
Cultivation among the moderate centrist forces of leaders focused on the development of mutually beneficial ties with the Russian Federation
NATO deterrence
Humanitarian sphere
Opening of a school at a Russian institution in Riga, which will become a center for strengthening the position of the Russian language, literature, and culture
Trade and economic sphere
Ensuring the protection of Russian assets in the territory of Latvia from possible court decisions to freeze or seize the property of the state or private companies
Reorientation of cargoes to Russian ports
2030
Military-political sphere and security
Addressing the problem of mass statelessness
Participation of Latvia in political alliances with Russia
Humanitarian sphere
Consolidation of the status of the Russian language as one of the state languages
Trade and economic sphere
Full-scale trade and economic cooperation
Many of these plans of the presidential administration can already be called failed. For example, “involving Latvia in the common agenda” with the help of environmental topics has become more difficult - Russia's membership in most environmental organizations in the Baltic Sea was terminated due to the invasion of Ukraine.
The Prime Minister of Latvia Krisjanis Karins also speaks about the decrease in the influence of the Kremlin in the country:
“Latvia has a realistic view of Russia's foreign policy and initiatives. In recent years, especially after the February 24, 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we have purposefully reduced the presence of the interests of Russia and its allies in Latvia and our economic and information space in order to reduce the likelihood of our eastern neighbor’s influence on the political course chosen by Latvia.” .
Containing NATO was another of Russia's key tasks, but the Kremlin's aggressive policy only strengthened it.
“Since Russia started the war in Ukraine in 2014, NATO has taken a number of measures to strengthen the security and defense of Latvia, other Baltic countries and NATO’s eastern flank in general <…> NATO’s presence in Latvia is not only a significant deterrent for Russia , but also the invaluable practical benefits that bring joint training and large-scale exercises with the participation of allied and Latvian troops. Thus, within the framework of NATO, the collective ability to protect Latvia from potential Russian military threats is being improved. All these actions and decisions of NATO impede Russian ambitions,” explained the head of the public relations department of the Latvian Ministry of Defense, Kaspars Galkinks.
It is noteworthy that in the Latvian strategy, the only one of all, the risk of freezing or arrest of Russian assets was separately indicated.
Lithuania
The introduction of agents of influence into Lithuania for the Kremlin seemed to be a more difficult task. The last Lithuanian leaders have been the most critical of the Kremlin's foreign policy. Thus, Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda was one of the first to propose sanctions against Nord Stream 2, considering this the only way to cause real economic damage to the regime of Vladimir Putin. Former President Dalia Grybauskaite called the Kremlin the main threat to the Baltic States and Poland.
Perhaps because of this, the Kremlin's plans for the development of "soft power" in Lithuania were more modest. As elsewhere, they were going to develop a network of pro-Russian NGOs and by 2030 hoped for the appearance of politicians who would at least “strive” to the development of Russian-Lithuanian relations.
There have already been similar figures in Lithuania, for example, the Union of Russians of Lithuania, which in the 2010s, collaborated with United Russia and supported the annexation of Crimea. Or the Russian Alliance, whose deputy was banned from issuing access to state secrets because of her connections with Russian officials. By the time the strategy was drawn up, both organizations had long been closed.
The main feature of the Kremlin's strategy in the Republic of Lithuania is the "containment" of Lithuania in support of the Russian opposition. According to the documents, already in 2021, the Kremlin considered the activities of Russian opposition structures in Lithuania a political threat. Now the Lithuanian law enforcers suspect that intelligence agents may be introduced into the republic to fight the opposition.
“Lithuania is one of the main destinations for emigration of Russian opposition activists. Several hundred Russians received asylum or other residence permits here and are now engaged in journalism and politics. Members of political, public and journalistic organizations regularly come here and hold their events here,” the Lithuanian State Security Department told the Expressen newspaper. - Russian intelligence is interested in information about the opposition in Lithuania, about their organizations, plans and methods of action. It is likely that the Russian intelligence services will introduce agents into opposition organizations operating in Lithuania, send employees under non-traditional cover to spy, and infiltrate the IT systems of opposition activists and organizations.
The main points of the Kremlin's plan in Lithuania
2022
Military-political sphere and security
Prevention of military build-up of the US and other NATO member countries on the territory of Lithuania
Preventing Lithuania from drawing post-Soviet states into NATO's sphere of influence
Humanitarian sphere
Expansion of Russian cultural presence in Lithuania
Trade and economic sphere
Protecting the interests of Russian economic operators involved in trade and economic relations with Lithuania
2025
Military-political sphere and security
Prevention of the deployment in Lithuania of medium-range air defense/missile defense systems integrated into the unified NATO air defense system
Reducing the number and scale of NATO military exercises in the Republic of Lithuania
Restraining the activity of the Republic of Lithuania in support of the Russian opposition
Humanitarian sphere
Strengthening the ties of local Russians with their historical homeland
Expanding the work of pro-Russian foundations, NPOs, and NGOs
Trade and economic sphere
Increasing supplies of Russian liquefied natural gas and electricity
Reorientation of cargoes to Russian ports
2030
Military-political sphere and security
Creation of conditions in which the Lithuanian leadership recognizes the damage to its national security from the build-up of NATO's military presence in the region
Restoration of constructive relations between Lithuania and Russia, including in the military sphere
The emergence of Lithuanian politicians seeking to develop Lithuanian-Russian relations
Humanitarian sphere
Preservation of the system of Russian-language education
Preservation of monuments, counteraction to "falsification of history" and "glorification of Nazism"
Trade and economic sphere
Full-scale trade and economic cooperation
Unlike the rest of the Baltic states, the Kremlin had specific demands on Lithuania in terms of containing NATO. The presidential administration feared the deployment of medium-range NATO air and missile defense systems in Lithuania and wanted to achieve a reduction in the number and scale of NATO activities in the country. Apparently, this is another plan that will not come true - in the summer of 2023, the NATO summit will be held in Vilnius. It, among other things, will discuss the strengthening of air defense and missile defense systems, and President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky will be the guest of honor.
“Military power is one of the main instruments of international influence for Russia. It allows the Kremlin to intimidate Russia's neighbors and the international community with the prospect of military conflict and strengthen its bargaining position. Russia's goal is to convince the international community that it is ready for a military confrontation if its demands are not taken into account. <...> According to the Kremlin, the air defense and / or missile defense systems in Lithuania will significantly reduce Russia's military superiority in the region and reduce the possibility of influencing Lithuania's decisions with the help of its military power, ”the Lithuanian State Security Service believes.
Estonia
In the northernmost Baltic country, Estonia, there are almost as many Russian speakers as in Latvia. The Kremlin tries to interact with local Russians with the help of marginal politicians who make contact and are ready to receive Russian funding.
Some politicians from Estonia's main opposition force, the Center Party, continue to repeat Kremlin propaganda theses even after the invasion of Ukraine. The former chairman of the Narva city council, Mikhail Stalnukhin, in an interview with the German news portal Taz, said that he did not believe in Russian aggression against Ukraine, and called Vladimir Zelensky "a clown who himself leads his country to death."
Judging by the documents, these are the kind of allies the Kremlin needs. According to the strategy, one of the main goals of the Presidential Administration in Estonia is “the formation of a positive image of the Russian Federation in order to weaken Russophobic sentiments and strengthen Eurosceptic views in Estonia.” At the same time, the Kremlin believed that Estonia was spreading separatist sentiments among the Russian Finno-Ugric peoples, and was going to resist them.
The main points of the Kremlin's plan in Estonia
2022
Military-political sphere and security
Opposition to the efforts of the Estonian side to develop separatism among representatives of the Finno-Ugric peoples in the Russian regions
Formation of pro-Russian sentiments among the political and military elites, the population of the Republic of Estonia
NATO's opposition to the militarization of Estonia
Humanitarian sphere
Formation of a network of pro-Kremlin NPOs and NGOs in the humanitarian sphere
Promotion of Russian culture
Expansion of the Russian cultural presence, work with children and youth
Trade and economic sphere
Attracting Estonian investments to the border regions of Russia
Attracting Estonian technologies to areas of interest to Russia. For example, in oil shale chemistry and green energy
2025
Military-political sphere and security
Formation in Estonian public opinion of the undesirability of the presence of NATO
Involving the Estonian leadership in resolving issues on the bilateral agenda
Creation of sustainable pro-Russian groups of influence in the Estonian political, military, and business elite
Humanitarian sphere
Formation of a favorable information background in relation to Russia
Targeted work with representatives of culture and civil society who want to improve relations with Russia
Expansion of Russian cultural and humanitarian influence
Economic sphere
Increase in the share of Russian exports
Attracting Estonian investments to the Russian economy
Increasing the level of transport connectivity of the border regions of Estonia and Russia
2030
Political, military-technical spheres and security
Support and increase the effectiveness of the actions of pro-Russian groups of influence in the Estonian political, military, and business elite
Restoration of relations between Estonia and Russia
Humanitarian sphere
Strengthening the positions of the Russian media, strengthening the information influence
Preservation of monuments, commonality of approaches to the interpretation of the historical past
Providing organizational, financial, legal, and informational support for pro-Russian NPOs and NGOs
Trade and economic sphere
Activation of cooperation in the interests of Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union
Attracting Estonian investments to Russian regions
Full-scale trade and economic cooperation
Now the implementation of many of these goals, especially those related to the trade and economic sphere, is difficult to imagine. For example, increasing the transport connectivity of the regions of Estonia and Russia or increasing the share of Russian exports in the country is hardly possible in a war.
“They set a goal to increase Russian exports to Estonia by 2022, but last summer Russia itself decided to close the Narva-Ivangorod border bridge to trucks. How can export be increased by closing the main route for it?” Alexander Toots was perplexed.
However, the goals described in the strategy are similar to what the Estonian authorities have faced before, he added:
“I can say that the document as a whole describes well the attitude and goals of the Russians towards Estonia. There is a bit of fiction and fantasy in it, as in each of their plans. I am sure some of those who have to implement it are well aware that many goals are unattainable.
All three strategies were developed in 2021, but the war against Ukraine has completely turned the political, economic, and humanitarian situation in the region. Because of this, the Kremlin is increasingly moving away from its plans - absolutely all the interlocutors of foreign journalists are sure of this.
“The people who wrote this document had no idea that reality would take a completely different turn [that Russia would start a war],” Toots said.
“As for some of the targets listed here, the train left the station a long time ago. These goals are very unrealistic. This means that they are deceiving themselves from the very beginning,” he added.
Now Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are the countries known for being the most critical of the Kremlin's foreign policy in the entire European Union. It was the tough stance that helped the Baltics build a policy that was safe for their independence when working with the Kremlin, explains Estonian journalist and political commentator Kadri Liik:
"For the Baltic political elites, formed during the years of perestroika and glasnost, public censure was the first step towards correcting mistakes."
They, according to Kadri Liik, understood the intentions of the Russian authorities better than others - not only because of the common post-Soviet past but because of the experience of working with modern Russia. The narratives that the Kremlin tried to promote in the Baltic states — support for the Russian-speaking population, nostalgia for the Soviet past, dissatisfaction with liberal democratic institutions, and the policies of Western European countries — turned out to be tools of propaganda and influence on the country's politics.
After the invasion of Russian troops into Ukraine, with subsequent sanctions against pro-Kremlin officials, businessmen, and journalists, it became much more difficult to influence the Baltic countries. But Russia is still keen to get back to the negotiating table with the region, resisting its strengthening of relations with the West. The Dossier Center will disclose plans of the Kremlin, developed after the invasion of Ukraine, in the next series of investigations.