Russian Digest
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ISW: Putin attempts to use Victory Day parade to show Russia’s continued influence in Central Asia
Russian President Vladimir Putin has invited his counterparts from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan to attend the annual Victory Day celebrations in Moscow on May 9.
The occasion marks the first time the Central Asian presidents will meet Putin after his indictment by the International Criminal Court.
Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, and Tajik presidents are reportedly attending Moscow's Victory Day parade, with some confirming their visit just one day before the event, the Institute for the Study of War said in its latest update. The late announcement suggests that the leaders are hesitant to publicly support the war, despite Kremlin attempts to project power.
In contrast to last year, Belarusian and Armenian presidents are also attending the parade while Turkmen President did not confirm his attendance. In 2022, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan did not hold Victory Day parades due to health concerns from the pandemic.
Putin will deliver a speech in Red Square, where he will be joined by leaders of several ex-Soviet republics. In last year's address, he made no mention of Ukraine but slammed the NATO military alliance for expanding to Russia's borders and hailed Soviet heroism in resisting Hitler.
Reflecting increased security concerns caused partly by recent drone attacks, Russian authorities have canceled the traditional flyover. There have also been reports of fewer soldiers and less military hardware joining this year's parade as the war against Ukraine takes a heavy toll on men and equipment.
"It could turn into a mass action." The Kremlin canceled the "Immortal Regiment" due to fears of leakage of data of those killed in Ukraine
Russia will host an abbreviated Victory Day celebration on Tuesday amid security concerns following a drone attack on the Kremlin last week and expectations of a Ukrainian counteroffensive.
The 78th anniversary of the Soviet Union's victory over Nazi Germany in World War II is likely to be one of the most modest celebrations in President Vladimir Putin's two decades in office.
Military parades have been canceled in more than 20 Russian cities, including several cities in Siberia, thousands of kilometers from the front line. Not a single Immortal Regiment procession, which is usually attended by millions, will not take place in Russia this year.
The decision to cancel Immortal Regiment was made earlier this year after a meeting with Sergei Kiriyenko, Putin's deputy chief of staff, a former Kremlin official told The Moscow Times.
Security considerations were probably not the main factor in the decision, he said. “The Kremlin feared what a cumulative effect the procession would have if masses of Russians marched on the Immortal Regiment with photographs and portraits of their loved ones, soldiers who died in the war in Ukraine,” the former official said. - Potentially, this could turn into a mass action of relatives and a legal one at that. It would have a destructive political effect."
The Russian offensive in eastern Ukraine in recent months has not resulted in significant territorial gains, and both sides have suffered heavy losses, especially during the battles for Bakhmut.
Immortal Regiment marches have been canceled to prevent an "unauthorized outpouring of grief" by the families of soldiers killed in Ukraine, says Dara Massicot, a military expert at US RAND Corp.
However, now the Russian command seems to be going on the defensive in anticipation of the expected Ukrainian counter-offensive. Many attribute the recent spate of attacks on oil installations, railroads, and airfields in Russia to Ukraine's attempts to disrupt Russian communications and supplies ahead of the attack. Officials in Kyiv neither confirm nor deny Ukraine's involvement in such operations.
Dozens of regions have banned the use of drones on Victory Day following strikes on the Kremlin and Russian oil installations last week, and independent media reports that local MPs in Moscow will be forced to participate in "anti-terrorist" patrols. According to Dmitry Peskov, on Friday, Putin discussed preparations for Victory Day with the Security Council.
The authorities took the unusual step of closing Red Square in Moscow for two weeks ahead of May 9, apparently out of fear of a possible attack. “The level of risk and the terrorist threat is now higher than ever,” a senior government official, who requested anonymity, told The Moscow Times.
“Ukraine has actually chosen the path of sabotage against Russia,” he says. “Canceling the Immortal Regiment is the right decision. First, you need to win, and then celebrate.
“From the very beginning of the war in Ukraine, the authorities tried to prevent the population from feeling that there was actually a war going on. And they are still trying to do this,” says Oleg Ignatov, senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. “But we see that the image of a normal life is gradually crumbling.”
The Kremlin has traditionally used Victory Day to demonstrate military might and stir up patriotic fervor. But a string of defeats in Ukraine and an expected attack by Kyiv forces mean this year's event will be overshadowed by heightened security measures and little interest from foreign leaders to participate.
Analysts say the upcoming military parades, including the one on Red Square, are likely to use far fewer regular troops and equipment than before the invasion of Ukraine. Russia has confirmed the deaths of fewer than 6,000 soldiers in Ukraine, US officials believe the real figure is over 40,000. “The goal will be to create an image of the Russian army that is healthy and seems “normal”, when in fact its parts are seriously damaged,” says Massicot from RAND Corp.
Massicot believes that officials organizing military parades across Russia will rely on the few military personnel not stationed in Ukraine, including sailors, conscripts doing active duty, cadets, and military instructors. “It will be more difficult for regional parades to hide the damage, as most of the ground forces and airborne units [paratroopers] have been transferred to Ukraine,” Massicot concludes.
Despite the risks, Russian officials said the Red Square parade would be comparable in scale to last year's. Earlier this year, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu promised that 125 pieces of military equipment and 10,000 personnel would take part in the parade.
Unlike in years past, only one foreign leader, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov, confirmed his presence at the festivities in Moscow in advance. Tajik President Emomali Rahmon was invited by Putin last week, and on Monday it became known that Turkmen leader Serdar Berdimuhamedov had been invited. It is unclear whether any of them will have time to arrive in such a short time. On Monday, Armenia announced that Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan would take part in the parade.
More Active Measures…
Dossier Center: Undercover rally
Translation: Russian authorities organized protests in Europe to cause divisions between Turkey, the EU, and Ukraine
The Russian authorities decided to take advantage of the tension and organize several more protest events in Europe in order to embroil Turkey and its NATO allies, as well as discredit Ukraine, the Dossier Center found out together with the publications DR, Expressen, Le Monde, NRK, Süddeutsche Zeitung, SVT, and Westdeutscher Rundfunk. The materials that the Dossier reveiwed were prepared in late January - early March 2023 in the administration of the President of Russia with the participation of intelligence officers.
EU targets Central Asia in drive to stop sanctioned goods reaching Russia
Several EU countries fear Brussels risk opening a Pandora’s box with a new measure that could eventually be used against China and Turkey.
Central Asian countries such as Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are the most likely first targets of a radical new EU proposal to stop Russia busting sanctions by importing the high-tech components required to wage war through its neighbors.
The EU is moving toward its 11th package of sanctions against Russia to try to sap President Vladimir Putin's military machine and, for the first time, its proposal will include counter-measures against countries helping Moscow dodge Brussels' trade embargo. China and Turkey are the nations most often credited with throwing Russia an economic lifeline — but EU diplomats cautioned that Ankara and Beijing were not their immediate targets, and that measures against such significant geostrategic trade partners risked backfiring.
Instead, three EU diplomats said the hope was that the EU's impending proposals on sanctions circumvention would encourage Central Asian states to fall into line. The full 11th sanctions package could be unveiled as early as Tuesday, when European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visits Kyiv to mark Europe Day.
Read More:
https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-aims-central-asia-sanction-circumvention-russia-war/
"There's nothing left." Six Russian regions were left without money in their accounts
Six regions of Russia have exhausted the balance of budget reserves and entered 2023 with a complete or almost complete lack of funds in their accounts. According to RBC, analysts of Expert RA came to this conclusion after analyzing the data of the Electronic Budget portal.
Although in general the “cash cushion” of the regions in 2022 increased by 13% and reached 2.28 trillion rubles, some subjects were forced to actively spend their savings, and some “ate” them without a trace.
This, in particular, is the Republic of Tuva, which has “nothing left” in its reserves, Expert RA states. Kalmykia, Buryatia, Karelia, the Murmansk region, and the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug also sent almost all the rest to cover the "holes" in the local budgets.
In general, the regions ended last year with a small budget surplus of 50 billion rubles: 50 subjects were in positive territory, while 35 received a deficit. Since the fall, however, one in three regions has experienced a tax shortfall, and five have experienced a full-fledged collapse in revenues.
Thus, in the fourth quarter, the Tyumen region missed every second ruble of taxes: fees fell by 48.9%. The income of the Krasnoyarsk Territory fell by 39%, the Murmansk region - by 33%, Khakassia - by 32%, and the Kemerovo region - by 30%.
The main source of problems for regional budgets was the tax on business profits, notes Alexander Deryugin, head of the budget policy laboratory of the Gaidar Institute: if in the first half of the year, its fees grew sharply (+45%), then in the second half a decline began (-30%), which accelerated up 40% in the fourth quarter.
2023 will bring new budget problems to the regions, Expert RA believes. Against the backdrop of sanctions against the largest Russian companies that cut off metallurgists, coal miners, and the woodworking industry from foreign markets, their deficit by the end of the year could amount to 1.9 trillion rubles.
According to analysts, the governors will have to spend about 800 billion rubles on the “airbag” to cover it. “The regions will probably sum up the results of 2023 with a decrease in account balances to 1.44 trillion rubles due to the planned partial coverage of the projected deficit of regional budgets and restrained expectations for tax and non-tax revenues,” Expert RA warns.
https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2023/05/08/shest-rossiiskih-regionov-ostalis-bez-deneg-na-schetah-a42369
'The Whole Army Must Move Forward': Fighting Rages In Bakhmut As Momentum Builds For Ukraine's Counteroffensive
Along the northern flank of Ukrainian-controlled territory on the outskirts of the eastern city of Bakhmut, tank crews from the 10th Mountain Assault Brigade are waiting for the ground to dry up so they can begin a long-anticipated counteroffensive against Russian forces.
The tank operators continue to support Ukrainian infantry during battles and provide cover fire from afar, but the muddy roads brought by thawed frozen ground and heavy spring rainfall have left them playing a less forward-leaning role.
“The Russians still have enough artillery and anti-tank weapons, including ATGMs [anti-tank guided missiles],” Mykola, a tank operator, told Current Time, following Ukrainian military protocol of only providing his first name to journalists. “We still have far from an easy time here and while it’s raining like it is now, it’s difficult to work.”
Read More:
https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-bakhmut-counteroffensive-russia-fighting/32399805.html
Poland provides 10 MiG-29 jets to Ukraine
Poland has sent over 10 MiG-29 jets to Ukraine, Poland's Defense Minister Mariusz Błaszczak says, as per Defense24.
Polish President Andrzej Duda previously promised that Poland would supply Ukraine with 14 MiG-29 aircraft.
At the beginning of April, Poland provided several MiG-29 jets to Ukraine. Mid-March, Duda promised to send four MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine in the coming days. “We can say for certain that we are sending these MiGs to Ukraine. Now we still have a dozen of these [aircraft]. We got them in the early 1990s from the East German army. These are the last years of their operation in accordance with their technical capabilities,” Duda explained.
Furthermore, the government of Slovakia approved the transfer of 13 MiG-29 fighters to Ukraine.
https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2023/05/08/poland-provides-10-mig-29-jets-to-ukraine-en-news
UN: At least 23,606 civilian casualties in Ukraine since start of Russia’s full-scale invasion
According to the United Nations human rights agency, Russia’s war against Ukraine has killed at least 8,791 civilians and wounded at least 14,815 from Feb. 24, 2022, to May 7.
From May 1 to 7, the OHCHR confirmed 221 civilian casualties in Ukraine.
In every update, the agency reports that the actual number of casualties is likely considerably higher since the information from places with ongoing hostilities is delayed. Also, many reports of civilian casualties still need to be verified.
Over the last several days, Russia has conducted a series of mass drone and missile attacks on Ukraine.
UN Human Rights chief Volker Turk said on March 31 that the number of civilian casualties in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine far outstrips official figures. “These figures are just the tip of the iceberg,” Turk said during a meeting of the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva.
"Report immediately." Moscow airports are preparing to repel drone attacks
Moscow airports are taking extra security measures amid a surge in reports of unauthorized drone flights. According to the Aviatorshchina telegram channel, airport workers were required to increase their vigilance and immediately report all foreign vehicles, stray items, and unmanned aerial vehicles in the airport area.
As a result of such measures, on the night of May 8, two reports of drones were registered at Vnukovo Airport alone. In the first case, the driver of the escort vehicle reported seeing a drone near the end of the runway. The second report came from the launch controller about the flight of an unidentified object over the command and control tower.
Additional security measures at Moscow airports are being introduced against the background of growing anxiety of citizens due to possible attacks by Ukrainian drones: for the first time since the beginning of the war, Russian citizens began to fear the transition of hostilities to Russian territory and began to massively report to the police about drones raised into the sky.
Dozens of flights were delayed at Moscow's Vnukovo airport on March 14 due to a quadrocopter. He flew close to the runway. The airport staff spotted the drone and reported it to the police.
In Sheremetyevo on May 4, a passenger of Aeroflot Boeing 737-800, who was returning to Moscow from Samara, noticed a drone flying not far from the plane in the window. Upon arrival, he owed this to the airport security service. Information about the rapprochement of the aircraft and the drone was not confirmed.
Another drone in Vnukovo was noticed on May 6 by passengers of a Boeing 737-800 of the Pobeda airline, which was flying from Moscow to Makhachkala. One of them told the crew that he saw a gray-green drone with a large nose, similar to Bayraktar, near the city of Troitsk.
The next day, an Aeroflot pilot saw an unidentified object quickly flying towards him near St. Petersburg. This object was not observed by air traffic controllers either on the display of the airborne collision warning system or on the airfield locator.
On April 29, Ukrainian drones attacked an oil depot in Kazachya Bay in Sevastopol. Attacks on Crimea continued on 1 May. A day later, a Ukrainian drone dropped an explosive device on defensive fortifications in the Belgorod region. Another drone attacked a building under construction in the Bryansk region, less than a kilometer from the Russian-Ukrainian border. On the night of May 3, an oil tank caught fire near the port of Taman in the Krasnodar Territory, and then two drones tried to attack the Kremlin.
Russia sanctions: EU to name and shame sanction evaders?
The EU is preparing the 11th round of sanctions against Russia over its war on Ukraine. One key focus is on preventing the further circumvention of sanctions by third states and firms.
The EU is currently discussing the issue of sanctions evasion in its 11th round of sanctions against Russia over the war in Ukraine. As chief spokesperson for the European Commission (EC) Eric Mamer confirmed, the commission passed on new proposals to its member states on Friday.
Since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the European Union (EU) has so far slapped 10 rounds of sanctions on Russia. These comprise listings of individuals, export and import bans, and sectoral measures in banking and transport, as well as the prohibition of Russian flights in EU airspace. Among the most substantial sanctions to-date have been the ban on Russian seaborne crude oil, and a price cap for crude oil and petroleum products. Still, despite extensive sanction packages, the Russian economy has not contracted as much as 2022 forecasts had predicted.
Read More:
https://www.dw.com/en/russia-sanctions-eu-to-name-and-shame-sanction-evaders/a-65553941
Posts show mall gunman researched attack, had Nazi tattoos
The man accused of killing eight people and wounding several others in a mass shooting at a suburban Dallas shopping mall researched when it was busiest and posted photos on social media in mid-April of a store near where he ultimately started his attack.
The posts by Mauricio Garcia on a Russian social networking site suggest the 33-year-old had been planning the attack for weeks before he stepped out of a silver sedan and opened fire Saturday. Among the dead were two elementary school-age sisters, a couple and their 3-year-old son, and a security guard.
Read more:
https://apnews.com/article/texas-mall-shooting-mauricio-garcia-424607c69a5df0adab64f236924ae4e2
New Danish investigation:
We followed the tracks of 15 suspected Russian spies
A closed city from the Cold War, a yellow brick building in Moscow, espionage aimed at green technology, and a possible recruitment attempt on Danish soil. This is the first part of a hitherto untold story about Russian activities in Denmark
"Are you recording?"
A woman's voice answers yes. She holds her mobile phone up to the small window of the plane so that you can see the wing and the markings that show it is a Russian government plane.
The plane has just taken off from Kastrup airport. The sky is blue and the spring sun is shining. It is April 17, 2022.
In the plane are a group of Russian diplomats and their families. They have been expelled from Denmark.
In the video recording, you can see the plane, an Ilyushin-96 from the state-owned airline Rossiya, rising above Øresund and swinging over Copenhagen. Soon after, the plane passes over Østerbro and the backyard where the wives hung out with the children by the pool on the hot summer days during their stay in Denmark, while their husbands looked after their work at the embassy.
Some of the wives have posted photos and videos from the journey home on social media. With their suitcases, quilted jackets, and teddy bears, the expelled look like ordinary families with young children. But according to the Danish authorities, they are also something else and more.
"They pose a risk to our national security that we cannot sit idly by."
The then foreign minister Jeppe Kofod (S) used big words when the government announced on 5 April 2022 that it had decided to expel 15 diplomats from the Russian embassy in Copenhagen.
The 15 are "intelligence officers" who "have carried out espionage on Danish soil", the minister explained to the press after an extraordinary meeting of the Foreign Policy Council.
The expulsion was historic. As far as is known, it was only the second time in more than 25 years that Denmark expelled foreign diplomats.
The initiative was coordinated with other EU and NATO countries. Over the course of a few days in April, a total of several hundred Russian diplomats were thrown at the gate, in what is probably the largest systematic mass expulsion of diplomats in recent times.
Russia immediately responded again with its own wave of expulsions. Including seven employees at the Danish embassy in Moscow.
It was part of the reshaping of the world order that unfolded before our eyes in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It was geopolitics with a hint of Cold War and John Le Carré. The headlines were many and big.
But when the dust had settled and the news media's spotlight was directed at new cases, a number of questions remained unanswered.
First of all: Who are the 15 supposed intelligence officers who have operated in this country? And what have they done during their time in Denmark?
This is information that the government and the Norwegian Police Intelligence Service (PET) have kept close to their hearts. According to our information, even the parliamentary politicians in the Foreign Policy Council were not briefed on the identity and specific activities of those expelled.
We decided to investigate the matter further.
Based on the official lists of foreign diplomats in Denmark, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs updates regularly, we have succeeded in identifying 12 of the 15 expelled.
See the list: Here are the suspected Russian spies who were expelled from Denmark
We've trawled social media for traces of them. We have used facial recognition technology to identify them and their contacts in photos and videos. We have traced addresses in both Denmark and Russia based on pictures on social media, and we have searched in leaked Russian registers and databases. And we have had confidential conversations with sources familiar with the intelligence world.
Against this background, we can today uncover a hitherto untold story about Russian activity in Denmark.
It's a story that draws threads to a closed Cold War city and a yellow brick building on the outskirts of Moscow. It is the story of a possible Russian attempt to recruit an adviser for a Greenlandic politician. And it is the story of a strong Russian interest in a particular Danish specialty: green technology.
The White House
Inside a solid steel fence, the Russian flag hangs like a dishcloth in the pouring rain.
Here, in a large white house on Østerbro in Copenhagen, is the Russian embassy in Denmark. And – if the Danish authorities are to be believed – the spy center for Vladimir Putin's secret services in Denmark.
Behind the metal fence, a tall, evergreen hedge covers the embassy. You can make out two large parabolas. The closest dish appears to be aimed at a satellite hanging low over the horizon.
On top of the embassy, we can see a small superstructure that is studded with various antennas. White curtains are drawn for all the windows.
Inside the steel fence, a muffled, metallic click sounds. Two women enter a lock and wait for the gate behind them to close so they can open the next one and get out. The two women are sheltered from the rain in thick down coats. They smile politely but won't answer questions and rush into a car with blue embassy plates.
The embassy at Østerbro is still here. But the staff has been decimated, just as it has happened everywhere in the Western world. The American newspaper The Washington Post has calculated that in 2022 more than 400 suspected intelligence officers were expelled from the Russian embassies in Europe. The ability of the Russian intelligence services to operate in European countries has thus been greatly weakened, says the assessment among Western intelligence officers.
There is much evidence that Denmark was among the countries that took the hardest action in connection with the expulsions. While Denmark expelled 15, our Nordic neighbors Sweden and Norway, for example, expelled just three Russian diplomats each. Finland expelled two.
Just this week, Norway expelled another 15 suspected Russian intelligence officers.
It is not the intelligence services but the government that decides whether a suspicion of espionage should lead to the expulsion of a diplomat. And there are several reasons why one may be reluctant to proceed with deportation. This may be due, among other things, to the risk that one's own diplomatic corps will be hit by a Russian response.
It appears that the Danish government took a close to uncompromising line in the wake of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
According to our information, PET considers the 15 expulsions to constitute something close to a clearing of the so-called rezidentura in Denmark. A term used by the Soviet intelligence services KGB and GRU during the Cold War for their bases abroad, and which is still used in intelligence circles.
We have not been able to clarify whether this means that the government has expelled all the Russian diplomats who are supposed to be intelligence officers. In the Netherlands, according to the television station NOS, the government chose to let some stay, partly because one of them acted as an official contact person for the Dutch intelligence services.
But it is clear that, according to PET's assessment, the action has had a great effect. The Danish authorities have so far only given very little information about the deportations to the public, but after we submitted parts of our research to PET and asked a number of questions, the service answers, among other things:
"The expulsion of the 15 Russian intelligence officers in Denmark a year ago has, according to PET's assessment, meant that Russia's capacity to spy on Danish soil through physical presence has been significantly reduced."
The closed city
It's amazing what you can find on social media.
Over time, several of the expelled Russian diplomats have created profiles on platforms such as VK, Instagram, and Facebook. And this is particularly true of many of their spouses and other relatives.
Along the way, we find information such as middle names and dates of birth that make it possible to trace their addresses in Russia.
We also find pictures of several of the expelled diplomats, which they themselves or their wives have uploaded over time. A picture was taken in an apartment in Moscow, where you can see a football pitch out the window. Based on the signage, we find the football field and thus the apartment. Another picture was taken in Copenhagen. A wife wishes her husband a happy birthday and posts the picture on Instagram on the same day.
As we run the many images through a facial recognition program, it produced results.
Images appear on the screen, for example, of young men in uniform living in tents, digging holes in the ground, and eating field rations. One of them uploaded photos of what looked like a military training camp to Russian social media VK in 2013.
In some of the images, our software has identified one of the expelled diplomats. A young, fair-haired man named Alexander Chugunov. who was stationed as an attaché at the embassy in Copenhagen from 2019 until his expulsion.
In the photos from 2013, he is wearing an army green uniform, and a 'K' on his shoulder indicates that he is currently a cadet and training as an officer.
The young men at the training camp wear shoulder badge that reveals they belong to the Center for Military Training at Lomonosov University in Moscow. The center offers a program for specially selected students who are given the opportunity to take a military education alongside their civilian education. In other words, it is an obvious breeding ground for future spies.
According to the program, the student is allocated to one of three departments, according to the centre's website. For example, if you study subjects such as economics, physics, mathematics, or engineering, you will be placed in a department managed by the Russian Air Force. In the departments, the young officer aspirants receive training in "military specialties", depending on the training they are undertaking.
There are indications that Alexander Chugunov was placed in the air force department. In some of the photos we have found from the training camp, the young men can be seen receiving marksmanship training under the direction of a man wearing a blue officer's cap with a turquoise strap. It corresponds to the colors of the Russian Air Force.
When later, via a leaked database, it succeeds in finding an address for Alexander Chugunov, something falls into place. He resides in the city of Krasnoznamensk, formerly known as Golitsyno-2, not far from Moscow.
It is one of the closed cities that arose in the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Foreigners were admitted, and residents were subject to restrictions on their freedom of movement and other severe restrictions. Usually, because the city housed something particularly sensitive or secret - for example, nuclear weapons or military installations.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of the closed cities were opened. But not Krasnoznamensk.
The city houses the command center Titov Space Control Centre, which belongs to the Russian Air Force. The center is allegedly responsible for collecting, processing, and analyzing the information intercepted by Russia's military satellites.
The GRU officer
Over the years, Roman Dobrokhotov has seen a bit of everything. He is an investigative journalist from Russia and founder of the media outlet The Insider, which from his exile in Riga has distinguished himself with revelations of, among other things, the Russian intelligence service's connections to the poisoning of President Putin's political opponents.
One of the pieces of information we send him in particular catches Roman Dobrokhotov's eye.
It is the address of a yellow brick building slightly northwest of central Moscow. This is where the wife of one of the expelled diplomats had her official residence, according to our searches in a leaked personal register of Moscow residents. Her husband's name is Sergey Maslov and he was stationed at the Russian Embassy in Copenhagen as assistant military attaché from 2019 until April 2022. On social media, we have found a picture of him in military uniform, which reveals that he has the rank of colonel.
The address in Moscow is known to Roman Dobrokhotov. It is a hangout for intelligence officers from the Russian military intelligence service GU, usually referred to under the former abbreviation GRU, he says.
In other words, we can connect one of the expelled diplomats who has operated on Danish soil with perhaps Russia's most notorious intelligence service. Among other things, the GRU is believed to have been behind the poisoning of the former double agent Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia in the British city of Salisbury with the nerve agent Novichok.
Or as Roman Dobrokhotov writes to us, since it is clear that Sergey Maslov can be connected to the GRU:
"He can actually be dangerous."
The resident
Russia has a handful of intelligence agencies. In addition to the military intelligence service GRU, the most important is the foreign intelligence service SVR and the security service FSB. The latter are the heirs of the infamous KGB, which was disbanded and split up in connection with the fall of the Soviet Union.
From defected KGB officers, a great deal is known about how Soviet espionage was organized during the Cold War. And according to our information, the Russian intelligence services in Denmark still operate according to largely the same manual as back then.
To understand how the Russian intelligence services work and what they do, we must therefore take a trip to the archives.
One of the defectors who has provided a detailed insight into the working methods of the KGB is Oleg Gordievsky. He was stationed as an intelligence officer at the Soviet embassy in Copenhagen in the period 1966-70 and again in 1972-77.
Among other things, Gordievsky has described how the intelligence officers at the embassy belonged to six different 'lines' in the KGB, each of which had its own task. The so-called PR line focused on political intelligence. Line X focused on science and technology, i.e. research and industrial espionage. Line SK focused on Soviet citizens living here. Line KR on counterespionage. Line F on special operations.
And finally, the so-called line N was tasked with providing support to illegal agents.
The Russian services generally operate with two types of intelligence officers: 'Legal' and 'Illegal'. It is a terminology that can seem misleading since both forms of espionage are illegal under Danish law. But the terms are used to distinguish between, on the one hand, intelligence officers with an official guise such as a diplomat, and, on the other hand, intelligence officers who pretend to be ordinary citizens.
In Denmark, there has not recently been a publicly known case of an illegal intelligence officer. The 15 expelled Russians all worked at the Russian embassy and were therefore, in the terminology of the spy world, legal. They were part of the so-called residency in Denmark.
The Rezidenturas are based in Russia's embassies and representations but are believed to function as separate hierarchies. Officially, the ambassador is the supreme commander of all embassy employees. In reality, the intelligence officers have their own local leader, the so-called resident.
The two dominant Russian foreign intelligence services each have separate structures at the embassies. That is, one GRU residency and one SVR residency under the direction of each resident.
So far it has been unclear whether both of the Russian residencies at the embassy in Copenhagen were affected by the Danish expulsions. But PET now confirms to us that this was the case:
"There were both intelligence officers from the GRU and SVR among the 15 intelligence officers who were expelled in April 2022," states the service, to which we have submitted parts of our research.
Based on information from KGB defectors, the Danish PET Commission has described that a resident during the Cold War was responsible for "all" the residency's activities in the posting country. And it was expected that the resident "personally participated in the operative work of managing agents and contacts".
The question is who has been a resident of GRU and SVR in Copenhagen in recent years? And thus leaders of Russia's espionage on Danish soil. We don't know for sure. But our research points particularly in the direction of one of the expelled diplomats, whom we have managed to identify: A stout, grey-haired man named Alexey Naumov. He was stationed in Denmark from January 2019 until his deportation in 2022.
Our presumption is due, firstly, to the fact that Naumov held the title of Counselor of the Embassy – a rank that, on paper, is surpassed only by the ambassador. Thus, he is one of the expelled diplomats we have identified who had the highest rank.
During the Cold War, the residents of the Soviet intelligence service KGB had the "typical rank of ambassador", according to the Danish PET Commission's report from 2009. And even if the KGB no longer exists, there are indications that the title is still attached to the position of a resident. In Sweden, the Russian diplomats who have been publicly identified as residents in recent years have had the title of Councilor of the Embassy. Furthermore, Naumov's age – according to our information he was born in October 1960 – befits a man at that stage in his career.
Alexey Naumov does not appear to have any social media profiles and there is little publicly available information about him. But much points to the fact that he has been stationed in other European countries before his stay in Denmark.
On a family member's social media, it appears that Alexey Naumov's family previously resided in the Netherlands. Here he was apparently many years ago, probably from the 1990s, stationed at the Russian trade representation in Amsterdam.
Resident or not: This is a man with a long career in Russian diplomacy. If the Danish authorities are right that Alexey Naumov is in fact an intelligence officer, this means that he may have been spying on several European countries for decades.
In Russian interest
It is of course difficult to uncover what exactly the expelled Russians have done in Denmark. But PET's public assessment of the espionage threat against Denmark can provide a clue.
The latest edition of the assessment was published in January 2022, shortly before the Russian invasion of Ukraine and just months before the expulsion of the 15 diplomats.
In the report, PET writes that the threat from foreign intelligence services has "become more significant". It emanates primarily from three countries: Russia, China, and Iran.
PET highlights the seconded intelligence officers at the Russian embassy in Denmark.
"These intelligence officers continuously try to recruit sources with access to classified or protected information of interest to Russia," writes the intelligence service.
But then what is of interest to the Russians? PET formulates it like this:
"Just like during the Cold War, Russia continues to focus on obtaining information on political, economic, and military conditions as well as on conditions that can strengthen Russia's position in the development of new technology."
The development of new technology should prove to be particularly relevant to our investigation.
As PET writes, Denmark is a leader in several fields in the world including technology, innovation, and research. Among other things in the field of energy and biotechnology. It is favorable for the Danish economy. But that also makes Denmark "an attractive target" for espionage from states such as Russia.
To us, PET elaborates that Russia specifically has an interest in "research into green technologies and renewable energy that constitutes an alternative to and thus a threat to Russia's export of fossil fuels".
Another Russian area of interest that proves relevant to us is Greenland.
PET states that, in line with China and the USA, Russia "increasingly" has "geostrategic, security policy and economic ambitions in the Arctic and the North Atlantic". This is due to several factors. As far as Greenland is concerned, the country's location is strategically important in relation to the passage of ships, submarines, and aircraft between the North Atlantic and the Arctic. It is also in Greenland where the American Thule Air Base is located. It "constitutes a central hub in the US's missile warning and missile defense system", writes PET, and also points to the major powers' "interest in the resources that are in Greenlandic underground."
So, of course, Russian intelligence officers in Denmark are interested in that part of the Commonwealth. Anything else would be weird.
The Counselor
It was a big day at Det Greenlandske Hus. In the middle of the pending election campaign, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, as the first Danish Prime Minister ever, had agreed to stand for a voter meeting on Greenland's role in the Commonwealth.
It was 20 May 2019. The premises in inner Copenhagen were covered with cookies and fruit. The audience sat on rows of chairs and sipped coffee and tea in white plastic mugs while they listened to the debate between the Prime Minister and the Greenlandic Member of Parliament Aaja Chemnitz (IA).
Løkke and Chemnitz talked, among other things, about defense policy - and the potential military threat from Russia. And they discussed whether Denmark should have a minister responsible for the Arctic.
In the back row sat Claus Perregaard, the former press manager of SF and adviser to the party's chairman and foreign minister Villy Søvndal. He had been interested in the Arctic and Greenlandic politics for a number of years. And since his exit from Danish politics in 2013, he had dealt professionally with Greenland as an independent consultant, among other things for Aaja Chemnitz.
Claus Perregaard, therefore, knew many of the other listeners. Greenlanders and Faroese living in Denmark and Danes with a professional connection to Greenland. But next to him sat a man whom he could not recognize.
"He seemed like a strange bird in that company," says Claus Perregaard, who is today an adviser to SF's chairman Pia Olsen Dyhr.
At a meeting on 20 May 2019, Prime Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen and Greenlandic member of Parliament Aaja Chemnitz (IA) debated, among other things, defense policy – and the potential military threat from Russia. In the back row sat Claus Perregaard, the former press manager of SF and adviser to the party's chairman and foreign minister Villy Søvndal
With his suit, the man was considerably more formally dressed than most others in a gathering where Fjällräven trousers and casual shoes were the norm. And there was also something strange about his behavior. The man seemed "extremely observant" and glanced around the hall, Claus Perregaard recalls. The two made eye contact several times.
After the debate, Claus Perregaard hung around a bit. There was something he wanted to turn around with Aaja Chemnitz. There were also many others who wanted to, so Claus Perregaard had to wait his turn. Out of the corner of his eye, he registered that the man from the back row was circling the room. After some time the man approached him.
"Then he said in English something like: 'You don't look particularly Greenlandic.' And asked what my interest was in being present at such an event,' recalls Claus Perregaard.
Claus Perregaard replied that he was present because of Aaja Chemnitz, with whom he had collaborated. And he had also dealt with Greenland for a number of years and followed the political discussion in the country closely.
The two talked a little. The man said that he had been put in charge of the Arctic. Claus Perregaard asked where he worked. The answer was the Russian Embassy.
"Then I could feel the little hairs starting to rise on the back of my neck," says Claus Perregaard.
The man asked if he could have Claus Perregaard's contact information and suggested that they should meet one day and have lunch. He expressed that he was interested in hearing more about Perregaard's view of the situation in Greenland and the discussion about independence. Claus Perregaard declined the offer and made it clear that he did not want to meet with anyone from the Russian embassy.
The man took it well. But when Claus Perregaard cycled away, the conversation continued to echo in his head.
Claus Perregaard knew well that there were intelligence officers among the diplomats at the Russian embassy in Copenhagen. During his time in the Danish Parliament and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he, like other employees, had been warned by PET about the possibility that he might be tried to be recruited as a source by foreign intelligence services.
When Claus Perregaard got home, he opened his computer and wrote to PET about what had happened. He wrote that it seemed to him like an attempt at – or at least a prelude to – recruitment.
"There are plenty of open sources that you can make assessments of. If they need to talk to people who have networks and such, then I could see no other possibility than that it was because they wanted other types of information that open sources would not be able to give them,' says Claus Perregaard.
"What I would potentially have been able to contribute, viewed in isolation, might be nothing. But coupled with the information they could get from all sorts of others, it could help paint a picture or give an insight into which Greenlandic politicians could be for sale, or what kind of agendas they can push if they will cause a stir in the duck pond, or what do I know.'
- But if a Danish diplomat in Moscow wanted to have lunch with someone, we probably wouldn't think that person was doing espionage. So why actually orient PET?
"I have dealt with some things over a number of years, which mean that my emergency preparedness is probably higher than most people's. It may well be that I have wronged him, and that we could have had a nice lunch and talked about Greenland, and that it would have been completely peaceful. But I didn't want to take that chance.'
Claus Perregaard does not remember the name of the man from the Russian embassy. In a photo from the event in 2019, he points out a man with high temples and sparse blond hair.
The same man appears in a photo of staff from the Russian Embassy in Copenhagen who participated in a football tournament in 2021. We have not been able to determine with certainty who he is.
When we ask PET about the matter, the service does not want to comment on the specific episode but replies:
"In general, the Russian intelligence services are professional, have many resources at their disposal, and have a long history of recruiting sources, and it is, therefore, PET's assessment that they work methodically and systematically with recruiting sources."
Shaking trips
The Russian diplomat's approach to Claus Perregaard is consistent with how intelligence officers typically make contact with potential new sources.
"An intelligence officer will often try to approach a person of interest in connection with public events, such as conferences," according to PET's threat assessment.
In the beginning, the intelligence officer will typically communicate with his contact in an open manner "and only ask 'harmless' and conversational questions", writes the intelligence service.
But if the intelligence officer considers that the person will be able to be recruited as a source, the communication will be "more hidden".
"After this, meetings will no longer be arranged over the phone or take place at major official events, but instead in more discreet forms, for example at a restaurant or a bar," writes PET.
It harmonizes with how the defected KGB colonel Oleg Gordievsky has described the work as a seconded intelligence officer in Denmark during the Cold War. Meetings with contacts and agents were usually moved to the suburbs of Copenhagen or to smaller towns such as Helsingør, Roskilde, Køge and Ringsted. Before meetings with agents and confidential contacts, the KGB officer had to drive around for hours to make sure he had shaken off any pursuers.
Over time, the intelligence officer will slowly begin to ask his contact about more confidential topics, according to PET's threat assessment.
"If the intelligence officer assesses that the contact has 'potential', the officer will at some point go one step further and try to recruit the contact," writes PET.
This can be done, for example, by offering money in return for cooperation. Or by blackmailing the person in question, "for example with knowledge of marital affairs or financial problems", writes PET.
The researcher
On a Friday afternoon in early summer 2020, Professor Niels J. Bjerrum sat in his office at DTU in Lyngby with a long-time colleague and transferred some files.
The colleague, the Russian researcher Aleksey Nikiforov, had stopped at DTU and had got a job in a North Jutland energy company. Now he stood to lose his access to DTU's IT systems. Therefore, the two had agreed that he could come over and transfer some measurement results from an experiment they had done together to Niels J. Bjerrum's computer.
The transfer took time. 79-year-old Niels J. Bjerrum went home – and left Aleksey Nikiforov alone in the office with the computer.
He had no qualms about that. They knew each other well. It was Niels J. Bjerrum who, back in 2008, had brought Nikiforov to Denmark as a Ph.D. student. And since then, they had collaborated for years on research into the green technology Power-to-X, i.e. how to convert electricity into other forms of energy.
When Niels J. Bjerrum came to work on Monday, he got quite a surprise. Colleagues in the department said that PET had appeared after Nikiforov had left.
"I was told that later in the evening six or seven PET people had appeared, who entered my office and sat looking at my computer," recalls Niels J. Bjerrum.
Soon after, Alexey Nikiforov was arrested and remanded in custody. He was later sentenced to three years in prison and permanent deportation for "over a number of years" having collected information about green technology from DTU and the North Jutland company SerEnergy and "passed this information on to a Russian intelligence service" in exchange for payment of "a significant amount in American dollar'.
The public today does not know much more about the case. The trial was conducted behind closed doors. It is therefore unknown what, more concretely, some information Nikiforov must have provided the Russian intelligence service with. And whether the episode with the computer played any role in the case. Niels J. Bjerrum doesn't know that either, he emphasizes. In general, however, he finds it difficult to see that his research would be particularly valuable to a Russian intelligence service.
"My assessment is that they have tried to trap him in one way or another," says Niels J. Bjerrum.
"The things they have asked for may not be something they have needed. But by giving him some money and trapping him in, maybe he could be used on another occasion. Then they had a crush on him.'
Who Alexey Nikiforov provided with information has not been publicly disclosed. But it is Niels J. Bjerrum's impression that the connection went via the Russian embassy.
"Alexey came to the embassy and had embassy contacts. I'm pretty sure of that,' says Niels J. Bjerrum.
The embassy connection is confirmed by two sources familiar with the matter. Alexey Nikiforov did not want to talk to us.
Unjustified
We have managed to find out a lot about the Russian diplomats and their activities in Denmark.
We can name 12 of the 15 expelled.
One we can connect to a closed city that is the hideout of Russia's signals intelligence service. One we can connect to is the infamous military intelligence service GRU. And we have a clear guess as to which of those expelled was the spy chief for the Kremlin in this country.
We have also uncovered an attempt to make contact with a Danish political adviser with a network and insight into Greenlandic politics. And we have found a direct connection between a convicted Russian researcher and the Russian embassy in Copenhagen.
Nevertheless, the Russian embassy maintains in a written response to us that the expulsion of the 15 diplomats was unfounded.
"This step on the Danish side was groundless and aimed at further destroying the relations between our countries," writes the embassy.
We have tried in vain to get a comment from the Russian intelligence services GRU and SVR. None of them have returned our inquiry.
We have also directly contacted the expelled diplomats whose contact details we have been able to find. In some cases via their spouses.
In several cases, we can see that our messages have been opened. But no one has returned.
Immediately after our inquiry, the wife of one of the expelled diplomats starts deleting pictures and videos from her profile on the social media VK. Including the footage of the expelled diplomats' return home from Denmark. A short time later, the profile is completely gone.
If the purpose is to prevent our research, she is too late. We have secured the tracks.
Home to Moscow
The expelled diplomats and their families had to go on a major detour, up along the Norwegian coast and around Northern Norway and Finland, before they could finally move south into Russian territory. As a result of the sanctions, the EU countries' airspace is closed to Russian aircraft.
Only after more than nine hours in the air did the plane land at Vnukovo Airport in Moscow at 20:00 local time on April 17, 2022.
In a picture from the homecoming that we have found on social media, you can see a woman with a cap pulled down on her forehead. On one arm she has a child in a blue flight suit with a pacifier in its mouth. The other is holding a little girl who is standing fondly with a teddy bear in her arms. In the background, one of the deported men is checking his mobile phone. Another trudges towards the stairs with a red suitcase in one hand and the other in his pocket.
Their time in Denmark is over. A new reality awaits in Russia – or wherever the expelled diplomats may be sent to in the world.